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Jesting Pilate 
by Carl E. Schneider 
What is Truth? said jesting Pilate; and 
would not stay for an answer. 
-Francis Bacon, OfTruth 
I have two goals this month. First, to examine a case that's in the news. 
Second, to counsel skepticism in 
reading news accounts of cases. 
Recently, I was talking with an ad-
mirable scholar. He said that transplant 
surgeons sometimes kill potential 
donors to obtain their organs efficiently. 
He added, "This isn't just an urban leg-
end-there's a real case in California." 
A little research turned up California 
v. Roozrokh. A little Googling found 
stories from several reputable news 
sources. Their headlines indeed intimat-
ed that a transplant surgeon had tried to 
kill a patient to get transplantable or-
gans. CNN.com: "Doctor accused of 
hastening death for patient's organs." 
Time: "Organ Donation[:] Did a Doc-
tor Speed a Patient's Death?" The New 
York Times: "Surgeon Accused of Speed-
ing a Death to Get Organs." These 
headlines (and the stories) implied, I 
thought, that a prosecutor had charged 
a surgeon with doing something in-
tended to kill a patient and that the pa-
tient had consequently died. 
I then discovered (with less journalis-
tic help) that there had been a prelimi-
nary hearing, a ruling, and a judicial 
opinion.1 The opinion revealed that the 
surgeon had actually been charged with 
three felonies: 
(1) "[D]ependent adult abuse ... 
by willfully causing and permitting 
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Ruben Navarro [the patient] to be 
placed in a situation in which his 
health was endangered by the pre-
scription of excessive amounts of 
morphine and Ativan, and/or by 
the introduction of Betadine into 
his stomach." 
(2) Violating a law that prohibits 
"willfully mingl[ing] any poison or 
harmful substance with any food, 
drink, medicine, or pharmaceutical 
product or . . . willfully plac[ing] 
any poison or harmful substance in 
any spring, well reservoir, or public 
water supply, where the person 
knows or should have known that 
the same would be taken by any 
human being to his or her injury." 
(3) Violating a statute which said 
that a "prescription for a controlled 
substance shall only be issued for a 
legitimate medical purpose." 
These were not the homicide charges 
I had expected. The headlines spoke of 
"hastening" or "speeding" a death. But 
"speeding" a death is murder. It does 
not matter that the victim is dying any-
way or that the victim would not have 
died had he been healthier. Hastening a 
death means being the proximate cause 
of the death, and that's murder. So if the 
surgeon had administered drugs to 
cause the patient to die, why no murder 
charge? Because the drugs did not actu-
ally kill the patient? Perhaps. But if the 
surgeon intended that they should kill, 
then the charge would presumably have 
been attempted murder. 
Reading the opinion brought more 
surprises. The judge dismissed the sec-
ond (mingling poison) charge. The 
statute did "not apply where, as here, 
the allegedly harmful substance is intro-
duced into a patient as part of a medical 
procedure, instead of being 'taken by 
any human being' by voluntarily (and 
typically unknowingly) ingesting it 
along with food, drink, or medicine." 
(In addition, the statute's legislative his-
tory "indicate[d] that this law was 
passed in response to incidents involv-
ing the poisoning of innocent victims 
who unknowingly consumed contami-
nated water supplies, tainted Halloween 
treats, or poisoned Tylenol products.") 
The judge also dismissed the third 
(legitimate medical purpose) charge. A 
"plain reading of the statute" showed 
that it was inapplicable, since it said, 
"An order for controlled substances for 
use by a patient in a ... licensed hospi-
tal shall be exempt from all require-
ments of this article." (In addition, the 
legislative history suggested that "the 
statute was designed to target 'prescrip-
tion mills' and practitioners operating 
outside of the hospital setting.") 
The court did permit the first (de-
pendent-adult abuse) count to go to 
trial. That count was markedly less seri-
ous than the homicide charge that the 
press reports had implied. To get a con-
viction, the prosecutor did not even 
have to show that the defendant had in-
tended to harm the patient, only that he 
was "criminally negligent" (that his con-
duct was "such a departure from what 
would be the conduct of an ordinarily 
prudent or careful person ... as to be 
incompatible with a proper regard for 
human life ... or [to show] an indiffer-
ence to consequences"). 
Of course, that's bad enough. So was 
the surgeon guilty? What had he actual-
ly done? The opinion said that for 
"many years" Mr. Navarro had "suffered 
from adrenoleukodystrophy, which 
causes damage to the nervous system 
and muscular system." On January 29, 
2006, respiratory and pulmonary arrest 
had led to "a severe anoxic brain injury." 
He was admitted to a hospital comatose 
and with a "poor" prognosis "for sur-
vival." A month later, his mother "gave 
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consent to withdraw life support from 
her son" and to make him an organ 
donor. "Because Mr. Navarro was not 
brain dead, it was determined that the 
transplant procedure to be used would 
be Donation After Cardiac Death 
(DCD), which requires withdrawal of 
life support leading to death prior to re-
covery of the organs." The surgeon "did 
not make or participate in making any 
of these decisions." 
The court commented that the de-
fendant "was less than one year out of 
his organ transplant fellowship." He 
had "observed . . . one DCD proce-
dure" but had never "been the primary 
surgeon'' in one. (The procedure is un-
usual.) He had been "accompanied" by 
"the Chief of Kidney Transplant 
Surgery at Kaiser Permanente," who 
had "never performed or assisted a 
DCD procedure." Furthermore, the 
"transplant coordinator" (apparently a 
nurse) "had never been a primary trans-
plant coordinator at a DCD procure-
ment." There had "never been a DCD 
procurement" at the hospital, and 
"none of the hospital staff who partici-
pated ... had any training or experience 
in DCD procedures." Finally, the hos-
pital had no "written DCD protocol," 
and there was no "national DCD proto-
col." 
When the two surgeons arrived, 
"there was no attending physician . . . 
caring for Mr. Navarro." There was "no 
medication for comfort care" in the op-
erating room. And "[w]hen the attend-
ing physician finally arrived in the Op-
erating Room, all other participants 
were already there, and she failed to un-
derstand that she was the responsible 
physician in charge of ordering medica-
tions for, and attending to the care of, 
Ruben Navarro." 
At this point, the court's narrative 
collapses because the evidence becomes 
contradictory. For example, the trans-
plant coordinator testified that she told 
the attending physician that she (the 
physician) would be responsible for the 
patient's care until he died and that she 
"understood this." The attending physi-
cian denied this testimony. 
The confusion about the drugs given 
the patient was worse. One witness said 
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medications were administered four 
times, another witness said three times, 
yet another witness said one time, and 
the fourth witness said she "was present 
for one administration, but heard that 
there had been another." One witness 
said a total of 180 milligrams of mor-
phine and eighty of Ativan were admin-
istered, another witness said the figures 
were 150 and sixty, a third witness said 
she didn't know, and the last witness 
saw fifty milligrams of morphine and 
twenty of Ativan given. Two witnesses 
said Betadine had been ordered by a 
transplant surgeon, but neither witness 
could say which one. The experienced 
surgeon said it was not he. Everyone 
else "in the Operating Room denied 
observing or hearing about the intro-
duction of Betadine, despite (at least in 
some cases) their greater involvement." 
And "no one charted the administration 
of medications in the Operating 
Room." Nor was it clear who had actu-
ally ordered the morphine and Ativan, 
partly because a doctor caring for the 
patient had earlier prescribed those 
drugs "in quantities of up to 10 mgs. 
every 15 minutes, on an 'as needed' 
basis (as determined by hospital nursing 
staff)." 
Whatever drugs were given, the pa-
tient (apparently) survived a number of 
hours after life support was withdrawn. 
(There was testimony that the patient 
had been receiving narcotics "for a sig-
nificant period of time, and likely had 
developed a tolerance to morphine.") 
Even had the evidence been less con-
tradictory, we would not know what ac-
tually happened. Preliminary hearings 
determine whether there is enough evi-
dence to justify a trial; they do not find 
facts. The defendant did not have to 
present his own case and (apparently) 
did not. So the court's story was neces-
sarily partial in both senses-incom-
plete and one-sided. In particular, 
"[t]here was no evidence ... on Defen-
dant's subjective intent." Nor (appar-
ently) did the defendant call expert wit-
nesses. So the defendant's lawyer could 
plausibly warn that after the trial "a 
great many people, lay and medical[,] 
will realize they have been significantly 
misinformed." 
For good reasons and bad, journal-
ism about law is often mistaken and 
misleading. For example, only one 
newspaper (the Wall Street Journa~ ac-
curately described any case I worked on 
during my year at the Supreme Court. 
And while some of the reporters who 
call to ask about legal issues are impres-
sive, many others prefer a good story to 
good information. Journalists report on 
the "newsworthy'' but ignore the vast 
bulk of law, and the odder and gaudier 
the legal development, the more news-
worthy it can be. Journalists rarely have 
training in the law, and they have scant 
time to educate themselves about an 
issue. Furthermore, law is hard to cover, 
not least because it is so fragmented. 
There are over fifty jurisdictions, each 
with legions of multifarious legal actors. 
And most legal events are just chapters 
in a long saga whose ultimate meaning 
emerges slowly. 
Roozrokh exemplifies many of these 
problems. As first-year law students 
quickly learn, even a single fact can 
transform a case. At this point, the legal 
system has only begun to gather and an-
alyze evidence. Some of the facts assert-
ed are certainly wrong, and new facts 
will surely emerge. News accounts of 
the case seem uncritically to imply, and 
readers about it seem uncritically to 
infer, that it fits the most obvious cate-
gory-a surgeon killing his patient for 
his organs. Perhaps it does. Yet it could 
also be, for example, a case about how 
inexperience, anxiety, and disorder lead 
to mistakes. After all, error and 
bungling are far more common than 
murder. So we need to wait until the 
case has finished its judicial journey and 
to scrutinize news reports skeptically 
before we draw legal and social lessons 
from Roozrokh. As Sherlock Holmes 
warned, "It is a capital mistake to theo-
rize before one has data. Insensibly one 
begins to twist facts to suit theories, in-
stead of theories to suit facts." 
l. Ruling After Preliminary Hearing, Case 
No F 405885, Superior Court of California, 
County of San Luis Obispo (March 19, 
2008). 
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